# N1BCzilC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 19 Cr. 802 (GBD) v. 5 MENDEL ZILBERBERG, 6 Defendant. 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. January 11, 2023 9 10:00 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. GEORGE B. DANIELS, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 DAMIAN WILLIAMS, 15 United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York BY: DINA McLEOD 16 DANIEL NESSIM 17 KIMBERLY RAVENER Assistant United States Attorneys 18 BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES PC 19 Attorneys for Defendant BY: BENJAMIN BRAFMAN 20 JACOB KAPLAN 21 22 23 24 25

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MS. McLEOD: Good morning, your Honor. Dina McLeod, Daniel Nessim, and Kimberly Ravener on behalf of the government.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. BRAFMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Benjamin Brafman and Jacob Kaplan on behalf of Mr. Zilberberg, who is present, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me start with the government. What's the status from the government's perspective?

MS. McLEOD: Your Honor, while I won't bury the lead, the basic status is that we understand from defense counsel that they are likely to seek an adjournment of the trial. government produced a number of documents that were produced to us from the FDIC earlier in the case, which weren't central in the government's case, but out of an abundance of caution, we produced. Defense counsel, due to their trial schedule, is going to be available starting in around May. So that's sort of the main status right now. There's obviously other sort of substantive issues about the case, but in terms of sort of the top line issue for your Honor in terms of scheduling and dates, that is an application that we understand to be coming from the defense today.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman, what's your situation?

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, we or all, I think, on both

sides are diligently preparing for trial beginning on the 23rd. Yesterday, we received 20,000 documents, 20,000 pages of documents that sensibly are related to the FDIC, and the FDIC had a central role in the investigation in this case. The charge was bank fraud and this began with substantial testimony before the FDIC.

The week before or two weeks before, we received 11,000 documents, and getting 20,000 documents yesterday makes it literally impossible for us to be able to carefully review them. And whether or not the government deems them to be relevant or not, we have an obligation, I think, to review them carefully because the FDIC is not taking a side position here. They have been central to the preparation of the case. So, in an abundance of caution, I think we have no choice, subject to your Honor's approval, to seek an adjournment.

another trial beginning in late February before Judge Irizarry, and that's been pending for three years. So that, I think, trial date is firmly set. We were going to go to the Eastern District to request a short adjournment of that date because of this trial running back to back, but if we get this trial adjourned, that trial won't have to be moved.

But the principal request, your Honor, is for this trial to be adjourned. We've conferred with the government and we believe, again, if you are available, sir, that the May date

would be acceptable. The government also asked us whether we would be available in July and the answer is yes as to both May and July. I think your Honor knows it's rare that I ask for an adjournment of a trial date. It's just what I do. And we prepared diligently, but to get 20,000 documents — and we're not faulting the government. These documents were, I think, accumulated by the FDIC, but they are a central player in this case, and not to have a chance to review them, if there were a conviction in this case, it would make it difficult for it to be sustained if we didn't have a chance to review those documents.

So, respectfully, your Honor, we are asking for an adjournment. Subject to your Honor's availability, we would be available in May or in July, which I think would be, both dates, acceptable to at least some members of the government team.

THE COURT: I already started lightening the calendar for the 23rd of January for this trial. My understanding, we're talking about approximately a three-week trial. Are we definitely or very likely going to go to trial on the next date?

MR. BRAFMAN: Well, Judge, my request is that it not be a starting date because we will not have had a chance to review these materials, even if we worked around the clock, 20,000 documents, and god only knows what they refer to and who

they relate to. There are a number of FDIC witnesses who will testify in this trial. Many of the interviews were done with members of the FDIC present when witnesses were reviewed as opposed to most cases where we get FDI 302s, we were getting FDIC reports of the interviews. There are also a wealth of testimony that was taken by the FDIC, and many of the principal witnesses in this case testified under oath before the FDIC. Now, we have had that testimony for a considerable period of time, but getting 11,000 documents and now 20,000 documents, I think it makes it impossible for us to provide effective assistance of counsel if we had to ignore what was in those materials and proceed to trial on the 23rd.

I apologize for this request, Judge, but I think you should recognize, respectfully, that we are in an untenable position because going to trial without reviewing those materials would introduce an ineffective assistance of counsel issue in the event that the defendant were convicted, and I don't want that issue in any case I diligently prepare for. But I think, Judge, it's an unfortunate development. I'm not faulting anyone for this development, but I certainly don't want us to be faulted for raising this issue on the eve of trial.

THE COURT: At this point, there's no possibility or likelihood of a disposition in this?

MR. BRAFMAN: I don't think so, your Honor. We have

had that discussion numerous times. The defendant maintains that he is not guilty. We have, I think, a reasonable, triable case from our perspective. I think he's entitled to a trial, obviously.

THE COURT: What week were you looking at either in May or July?

MR. BRAFMAN: We had the opportunity to confer with your courtroom deputy and we were looking for either mid May, and then very recently before your Honor got on the bench, the government asked whether we would be available in July, and I think both dates would be acceptable.

THE COURT: And there's no other month or weeks that are possible?

MR. BRAFMAN: Well, what we may do is, your Honor, if your Honor would agree, we would later today look at our respective calendars, confer with the government, and then send a note to the Court as to what other dates might be acceptable. I don't believe April is available because of the trial in the Eastern District, and also the Passover holiday comes out right in between.

THE COURT: I'd like to give you an earlier date rather than a later date. May, I can just tell you right now, I think I have a trial scheduled for May 15th already. Also, last year, and I don't know if there's going to be a possibility this year, I sat for a week on the Ninth Circuit,

so I wasn't here for a week and I was in California. So I don't know whether or not whether I'm going to be asked to come back out there.

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, may I suggest that if the January 23rd date is adjourned by the Court, we can confer with the government either later today or tomorrow, send your Honor's deputy or your Honor a list of dates that we would be available, we would waive speedy trial obviously because it's our request, and then the Court could look at those dates and give us another day at your Honor's convenience.

THE COURT: Why don't we do this, let me pick a date that's convenient for the parties for a pretrial conference in about 60 days. Between now and then, you can propose some specific dates, as many as you can for two or three months in those months, and I can check my schedule and see what makes sense.

So we'll adjourn the trial. I would say maybe a March 21st pretrial conference. We can see whether or not we can firm up a trial date between now and then or on that date.

MR. BRAFMAN: I think March 21st is available to defendant, your Honor.

THE COURT: At 10 o'clock.

MS. McLEOD: That's fine for the government.

THE COURT: Let's have a pretrial conference on that date.

In the next few weeks, give me some proposed dates for trial. If I can respond quickly to you and make those dates available, then I'll get back to you even before the March 21st pretrial conference and we can either have that or adjourn that if we don't need to meet at that time.

I know there's an outstanding motion. I was going to be prepared to at least discuss that today. Did you want to address that today or did you want to put that off until --

MS. McLEOD: I think the parties both wanted to address it today.

THE COURT: My understanding, it was short circuited, but my understanding with regard to the issues is that the government has some evidence that they say is possibly 404(b) evidence. My recollection of the papers is that the government has three or four incidents that they wanted to use and the defense has objected to one of those.

MR. BRAFMAN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I think the one that the defense objected to is the financial transactions with the niece?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I guess my direct question to the government in reviewing the papers is that I understand -- well, two things. The government has at least two or three incidents besides that that they want to offer, and those incidents are more akin to, I'll say, the MO that the

government contends is the pattern in this case. It seems to me that, in one sense, this niece issue is cumulative of that and that the niece issue is not the same MO as the other instances that the government wants to offer at trial. I'm trying to figure out if the government is going to offer two or three other instances that they say is the same MO as they say is the evidence in this case. What is the need for the niece situation in addition, and why is that relevant if it's not the same MO as the government contends is its case here and as it contends is the situation in the other instances?

MS. McLEOD: So a couple things. So there is the charged loan, which I think we defined as loan 1, and then there are three other extensions of credit, there are various types of extensions of credit, one of which is the niece. So, in total, the government is seeking to introduce three in addition to the charged loan.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You just confused me because you just gave me four. You said that there is one --

MS. McLEOD: There is the charged loan, which is 1.

THE COURT: When you say the charged loan --

MS. McLEOD: That is the one that is the subject of the indictment.

THE COURT: The charges in this case?

MS. McLEOD: Yes.

THE COURT: And then three others.

MS. McLEOD: And then three others, including the niece.

THE COURT: So if you get two out of the three, why do you need the niece and why is the niece's pattern and MO more relevant or as relevant as the pattern and MO in the other two?

MS. McLEOD: So, first, as to the pattern, the MO is very similar in all three in the sense that --

THE COURT: I didn't understand that the MO with the niece was the same kind of structured transaction as the other two and as is charged in this case.

MS. McLEOD: Well, they are all straw loans that the defendant steered to Park Avenue Bank. He then facilitated and controlled much of the transaction in the sense that he was the person sort of mainly corresponding with the bank and sort of pushing the loan through. In all of these transactions, he failed to disclose his personal financial interest in the proceeds of the loan. There were similar misstatements in all three of the loans.

So, for example, in both loan 2, which is the niece loan, they say that the purpose of the loan is working capital for a business, which is false. Then, in another loan, I think it's loan 3, they also state working capital for a business. So the misstatements among the loan applications are almost identical in terms of the false purpose of the loan.

THE COURT: But I thought that the other two loans

were more -- the activity of the other two loans was similar to the activity that you claim occurred in this case and that of the three instances that the personal loan to the niece was not structured in the same way as those other two loans and as the charged loan.

MS. McLEOD: Well, they all have slightly different structures to them, they're different types of loans. I mean even --

THE COURT: I mean, you know more than I, but do you not think that the other two loans are, as you've laid them out in your papers, structured in a more similar way than the niece loan?

MS. McLEOD: I wouldn't say they're structured in a more similar way. I would say that they are more alike in terms of time period --

THE COURT: Well, aren't they more alike in terms of -- I mean, your theory of this case is what, that he got together with a codefendant outside of the bank, they structured false loans that would go to a company, and I don't know if I have the facts as you claim them, and that paperwork was done to transact that loan with this company and the loan was approved. Mr. Zilberberg, being the bank officer, received part of those proceeds. My understanding is that's what you say similarly happened in these other two transactions, but that's not exactly the way that you say the transaction with

the niece took place.

MS. McLEOD: They have very similar relevant characteristics. The key characteristics --

THE COURT: I'm talking more about the differences.

MS. McLEOD: Well, again, they all have slight differences from each other.

THE COURT: Why do you need the niece transaction? If you have two other transactions that you say are structured in a way that, as I say, the same MO, structured in a way where there's a phoney company, as you say, that's set up, that false information is provided to the bank for this loan, the loan is approved, and the defendant allegedly receives a portion of those proceeds, that's not exactly what happened in the niece loan, is it?

MS. McLEOD: What happened in the niece loan is that --

THE COURT: Answer that first. That's not the way the niece loan was structured.

MS. McLEOD: In the sense that there weren't other coconspirators involved.

THE COURT: In any sense, tell me in what way -- did I mischaracterize the way this case and the other two loans were structured? I mean, that's my understanding, what you presented me.

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1	MS. McLEOD: I don't think so. I also think that		
2	THE COURT: But that's not the way the niece loan was		
3	structured. First of all, did the niece loan involve setting		
4	up a phoney company?		
5	MS. McLEOD: So I don't think any of the loans involve		
6	setting up a phoney company. The companies all existed and		
7	they were legitimate. Actually, in some ways, that makes the		
8	niece loan the most probative		
9	THE COURT: Why?		
10	MS. McLEOD: Because in that case, in all of the other		
11	cases, there were actual companies involved that were being		
12	described as the companies that would receive the loan.		
13	THE COURT: But the niece loan didn't involve a		
14	company.		
15	MS. McLEOD: But the representation to the bank was		
16	that she had a business. So it's actually the most		
17	THE COURT: But it wasn't a business loan to the		
18	company.		
19	MS. McLEOD: No, but none of these were business		
20	loans, they were all personal loans.		
21	THE COURT: Okay.		
22	MS. McLEOD: So they were all for working capital,		
23	that was the purpose, but these were personal loans. So, for		

example, loan 3 was a personal line of credit to the borrower

there. So the business versus personal distinction does not

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1	make	_

THE COURT: So tell me what happened in the niece loan.

MS. McLEOD: So with the niece loan, she —— essentially, the defendant told her, you know, there's a good business opportunity for you, you can make some money, you just open an account at Park Avenue Bank and I'll take care of it. And she then signed a bunch of paperwork, which she didn't read and didn't know really what was in it. As it turns out, it was a loan which used her savings as the collateral for the loan, which was a little over \$100,000. Those proceeds went to the defendant. The misrepresentations in that loan paperwork were frankly very clearcut. The niece is a ——

THE COURT: Representations made by whom?

MS. McLEOD: The government would allege the defendant because he prepared the paperwork.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I'm trying to understand.

So is it your position that the niece is a coconspirator in a criminal transaction?

MS. McLEOD: No, because she did not know about the representations. She didn't know false representations were being made.

THE COURT: But in all other cases, that's not true?

MS. McLEOD: So in the charged loan, in that case, as

well, that straw borrower also did not read the loan paperwork and did not know --

THE COURT: What was Mr. Fried's role?

MS. McLEOD: Mr. Fried -- so one of the other straw borrowers was Mr. Fried's father-in-law, so he was involved in that loan. Actually, in that loan, as well, that straw borrower didn't know either. So most of the loans, actually out of the four, three of them involve straw borrowers that didn't understand.

THE COURT: How many of those involved Mr. Fried?

MS. McLEOD: Two.

THE COURT: Okay. The other two, other than the niece's transaction?

MS. McLEOD: No, that includes the charged loan. Out of the three -- I'll call them three 404(b) loans versus the charged loan. The charged loan involved Mr. Fried and one of the three 404(b) loans involved Mr. --

THE COURT: So you have the charged loan which involves Mr. Fried, you have the other loan, one of these other three loans that involve Mr. Fried, and you have a loan transaction that doesn't involve Mr. Fried. Why do you need the niece?

MS. McLEOD: Two of them. So a couple of reasons.

One is that the representations on the niece loan are far more probative because they are so clearcut in terms of the falsity.

So this is going back to my point about the companies and the working capital.

THE COURT: How is it more clearcut? I'm not sure either the information was true or it was false. Either bank fraud was committed or it was --

MS. McLEOD: I agree, but some things are much clearer, and let me explain why. So the other three loans, the claim was this is for working capital for companies. In most of those cases, the companies existed, these were real companies. In the niece's case, the claim was this was working capital for a business. The niece is a special ed teacher, she has no business, and what's another sort of really key point that makes this loan incredibly probative is that Zilberberg has a clear personal relationship with the niece. So there's no question that he would have known that she did not have a business. And she would testify, I trusted him and he took care of all the paperwork. So in some ways, that makes it much more probative of the other loans —

THE COURT: Probative of what?

MS. McLEOD: Of his state of mind and of his knowledge --

THE COURT: You don't think you have sufficient evidence in this case and in combination with two other transactions that demonstrate, sufficiently, his state of mind?

MS. McLEOD: No, and part of it is because I expect

that the defense is going to argue this is all Aaron Fried.

They're going to say Fried did all of this, he was involved in these loans, he's the mastermind --

THE COURT: And your response would be Mr. Fried was involved in the charged offense, Mr. Fried was also involved in a second offense, and here's another third offense that Mr. Fried had nothing to do with that we can demonstrate.

MS. McLEOD: Exactly, so --

THE COURT: Okay. All of that is without the niece.

MS. McLEOD: Well, the niece is the first one that the defendant --

THE COURT: I'm saying if you don't use the niece, you still have Mr. Fried involved in this transaction, you say you have Mr. Fried involved in a second transaction, and you say that if you can put it all on Fried, you have a third incident where Mr. Fried is not even involved that you can demonstrate that this defendant's criminal —

MS. McLEOD: Right. The fact we have an extra one, another one doesn't make the niece cumulative.

THE COURT: The question still is whether or not -- I mean, if you tell me you have three things to prove the same issue, I'm not sure it's not cumulative, and I'm not sure that the personal relationship between interjecting the personal relationship between the defendant and the niece is not more prejudicial or confusing than it is probative. You have all

sorts of other probative evidence.

MS. McLEOD: So I'm happy to respond to the prejudicial point, but if I could respond to the relevance point first.

I just want to take a 30,000-foot view here. So the government's allegations are going to be that the defendant had a calculated plan. He needed money, he was on the board of his bank and he knew the way the bank worked, and over a course of, frankly, a very short period of time, about a year, he steered four straw loans to the bank that he knew he was going to be a beneficiary of, but did not disclose that to the board, despite there being regulations about that. Those loans had very similar misstatements about what they were going to be used for, the purpose of the loan. We expect that the defense is going to, in part, say, you know what, look, he may have received some of this money, but that was because he was being paid for legal fees and Fried was the one who was handling all of the representations. So all of this, you can't pin this on him, he just didn't know.

THE COURT: And your response is, he did it at least two times before?

MS. McLEOD: Yes.

THE COURT: But you want to say he did it at least three times before.

MS. McLEOD: Twice, the niece puts the lie to that.

The niece puts the lie to that because --

THE COURT: So does the other instances you're talking about, don't they?

MS. McLEOD: Well, there's one other that doesn't — there's one that involves Fried, Fried's father—in—law, and then there's the charged loan, which also involves Fried.

THE COURT: And the one that doesn't involve Fried, why is that not just as probative, if not more probative than the niece's?

MS. McLEOD: Because that involves a client of the defendant who was seeking a line of credit, a personal line of credit for his own business. That business existed and he received some of the funds, and some of the funds from this line of credit went to his business and some went to the defendant. So the question of what working capital is in terms of legal fees is murkier, a little bit murkier on that question, right.

So I think the government's argument would be you received money from this loan and you knew that these misstatements were false. But that was my point about the niece being more clearcut. When you have a business and some of the money is going to the business and some is going to pay legal fees for your attorney, that's not as clear as a case where you'd have a niece that the niece will say he did all of this, he takes all of the money from this loan, which the niece

doesn't even really realize that was what was happening. The statements are about things that the defendant, I think the jury can reasonably infer, would have known, I think this niece can testify, he knew I didn't have a business, I'm a special needs teacher. So the intent and the knowledge are much clearer than the third case. So that's one of the reasons they're not cumulative.

THE COURT: I'm not sure, I just don't have enough of the facts. I'm not sure why you say it's much clearer than the others.

MS. McLEOD: So I think what might be helpful, I think, and I think it's helpful to have this conversation because I have a sense of what you're attuned to in terms of the factual nature of it. I think because it's so specific, maybe it would make sense for us to put in a letter where we describe in much more detail the differences between the loans, because it sounds like that is understandably an important point for you, and if that's not crystal clear, then I want to make sure that it is.

THE COURT: My concern is this, if you have evidence in this case, you have evidence of another transaction that you say is similarly criminal that Mr. Fried was a coconspirator and you have another transaction where Mr. Fried's not even involved, I don't know why the niece is a critical part of your case here. And there's a basic old rule that used to be

followed that, as they say, if you can't win this case without that, then maybe you shouldn't have brought this case. If the niece's evidence is the critical piece of this case, what you just described is if you do present it the way you presented it, the jury is going to be faced with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was involved in this transaction with Mr. Fried, proof that he was involved in a previous transaction, similar transaction with Mr. Fried if he claims no criminal intent. Then if he claims, well, I didn't do it, Mr. Fried did it all, you say you have another case where Mr. Fried is not even involved that you can show to rebut that evidence. And I'm not sure that the jury needs to spend their time trying to figure out whether the -- I assume that you don't have any conviction of anyone with regard to the niece's transaction?

MS. McLEOD: Correct.

THE COURT: So I'm not sure why it's worth the jury's time and attention, and it's not more prejudicial for them, on top of the evidence that you have in this case, on top of the similar evidence that you have involving Mr. Fried, in light of the similar evidence you have that doesn't involve Mr. Fried, that they should spend their time making a determination of whether or not he and the niece defrauded the bank and whether or not that is significantly probative of whether he committed this crime.

MS. McLEOD: So, first of all, to the point about the jury's time, this will be a relatively short trial and this will be one witness, right, it's just the niece, she's maybe 30 minutes, she's got two documents. This is not going to be a circus around this one person.

THE COURT: You're going to guarantee me that?

MS. McLEOD: Look, I don't know what Mr. Brafman is going to do.

THE COURT: You're not even sure what you're going to be compelled to do, that's the question.

MS. McLEOD: Look, I think, again, to sort of take a step back, as you mentioned, the government has the burden of proof here and this is a case where the intent and knowledge are the key issues in the case. What did the defendant know, what did he intend to do. And it's a fraud case, so a lot of the argument is going to be circumstantial. So these are cases where every piece of evidence that the government can bring to bear, especially — and again, I'm happy to put in a letter to sort of explain, but exactly why the niece in particular is so probative, but to have an example of a case where the defendant and the defendant alone was the person who knew what was happening and was in charge of it.

THE COURT: But you have that case without the niece.

MS. McLEOD: So, respectfully, I don't think we do,

and that's why --

THE COURT: Because you just said to me that Mr. Fried is not involved in one of these prior instances that you want to put in evidence --

MS. McLEOD: I guess what I'm suggesting to you is that the involvement of Mr. Fried is just one of the important points about the loans.

THE COURT: But on that point, that point seems to be that you already have evidence to rebut that argument.

MS. McLEOD: Perhaps as to that point. But again, in the case with the niece, there is really no question that he — frankly, the argument is extremely compelling, that he knew what the misrepresentation was because this is his niece and he knows that she doesn't have a business, she's a special ed teacher. His client, he has a business, he's going to say, look, of course he had a business, I thought it was for the business, it wasn't my business what he was doing paying me with the money, I didn't tell him to do that. That's very different from the niece where he was the controlling person behind it and he — the evidence, again, the argument is, I think, very compelling that there's no way he didn't know.

THE COURT: You don't think the argument is very compelling with the evidence you have of this case independent of that, the evidence that comes with the extra Fried transaction and the evidence that comes with the non-Fried transaction?

MS. McLEOD: Well, I mean, of course, as the government, you hope your evidence is compelling. We got to put --

THE COURT: That's why I'm trying to understand why you need this additional transaction and what is it that you cannot -- you think you might not sufficiently be able to demonstrate by having the evidence in this case, the evidence of a prior transaction between these two coconspirators, and the evidence of a prior transaction without Mr. Fried.

MS. McLEOD: I mean, if the Court's concern is the number of transactions, and then that's a question of choosing — if it's sort of the Court would only like us to put on only two 404(b) loans, then we can pick one or the other, then we're happy to —

THE COURT: No, that's not my concern. My concern is that you want to put on three, they've objected to one. My concern is that the personal nature of the third transaction is significantly different than the nature of the other transaction. I'm not sure, again, other than, as they say, the MO, I'm not sure what else that you want to argue additionally and demonstrate additionally with the niece's transaction that you don't have sufficient evidence and don't intend to offer sufficient evidence without the niece's transaction. The way you tell me as so, there's not a significant difference, I understand the compelling part of your argument about the

nature of her position and the relationship, but I am coupling that with my assessment of whether or not this personal relationship with the niece raises other issues for the jury and may have some prejudice in this case that the other independent transactions, if they are powerful evidence of MO, then I assume your position is that you could probably, I assume, I hope that the government's position is that you could probably prove this case even without any of these prior situations because you have sufficient evidence that indicates that the defendant has committed this crime, the sufficient involvement and knowledge to commit this crime. This isn't a case where the government says that I need some similar act evidence and, Judge, if you don't give us this, we won't have any similar act evidence.

MS. McLEOD: So a couple points. One, I think your Honor is right about sort of the -- I think you're attuned to the issue sort of about personal nature. The personal nature of the relationship is part of what makes it so probative. So the fact that this is somebody who he knew so well is part of what makes it probative. Part of it is not just the fact that he would have had knowledge of her profession and the fact that she didn't have a business and pushed the loan through knowing she didn't have a business and that that was false, right, but it's also the fact that the defendant, in doing this, had to take advantage of trust relationships with lots of people.

1 THE COURT: Right.

MS. McLEOD: And that's a big part of, you know, I think what's going to be the narrative of the government's case that --

THE COURT: I'm not sure the nature of the trust relationship is significantly different for the charged offense and the other two similar acts --

MS. McLEOD: And that's exactly why it's not more inflammatory. So if the trust relationship isn't more different than the charged loan, then certainly that --

THE COURT: My statement was about the other two, it wasn't about the niece loan.

MS. McLEOD: Right. Maybe I just misunderstood.

THE COURT: I'm saying that the nature of the charge here and the nature of the evidence with regard to the two instances that they're not objecting to addresses that issue.

MS. McLEOD: In at least one of those loans, there was taking advantage of a family member, it was just the defendant's coconspirator who did it. These aren't sort of situations where it's so far afield from what this is about.

And the other thing I would sort of note is the general allegations. I mean, it's a criminal trial, so the allegations are going to be the defendant did bad things, right. The question is whether it's unfairly prejudicial to him. So the government's case is going to be about this is

somebody who was on the board of directors of a bank, had a fiduciary duty to the bank, betrayed the trust of the bank and bilked it out of a lot of money while the bank was at its lowest point right before the bank went under, he was getting money out the door just as the bank was about to fail.

THE COURT: And the question is you want to prove that by the direct evidence in this case and evidence of three different transactions as opposed to prove that by the evidence in this case and the evidence of two transactions.

MS. McLEOD: My point about the narrative of the case was more to the 403 point, that the allegations in this case are alleging things that the defendant did that are bad because that is what a criminal trial is about. However, the question is, is that unfairly prejudicial to him and is it worse than anything that is going to be before the jury for direct evidence. What I'm saying is the evidence is going to be that he did very, very bad things. And the fact that —

THE COURT: Well, it is prejudicial to the defendant. If it wasn't prejudicial to the defendant, you wouldn't be offering it.

MS. McLEOD: Exactly.

THE COURT: The question is, is a third transaction unduly prejudicial to the defendant as opposed to a second transaction, as opposed to a fifth transaction, as opposed to a tenth transaction. I will give you an opportunity to submit a

further letter on this understanding what my concerns are, but it seems to me that my reaction at this point and not necessarily my ruling at this point, but my reaction is that it seems to me that it would be, in fairness, appropriate for the government to put in its evidence on this case and put in two separate, different transactions that they say that would rebut any claim of mistake or lack of knowledge or lack of intent and wait and see if the defendant testifies in this case to see whether or not it is appropriate in response to whatever his claim of defense is to make a further application, that in response to that testimony, to put on the evidence of the niece.

MS. McLEOD: Your point is well taken. I think we will put in an additional letter just to make sure that we sort of highlighted any key facts that we think are relevant.

I'll just leave you with one final point, because I think we've discussed --

THE COURT: And then I'll hear briefly from Mr. Brafman.

MS. McLEOD: But the final point I would make is that I think it's important for the government and I think it would be part of our case, all of these are of a piece with each other, it's a pattern of conduct. So sort of slicing and dicing them is well, pick one, pick one, pick one, pick two. The point is that this is a course of conduct throughout which

we can show the defendant's knowledge.

THE COURT: Two separate transactions aside from this transaction, in the abstract, can do that. Three transactions, other than the charged transaction, can also do that. So the question is, why do you need three instead of two? That's really my issue.

MS. McLEOD: We will put in something on that, but hopefully address some of your Honor's concerns.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman, did you want to be heard?

MR. BRAFMAN: Just briefly, your Honor. I think the

Court is correct, sir, in focusing on the prejudice that comes

into the case that the government really doesn't need.

And in terms of the lack of probative value of the niece's loan, it happens before any of the other transactions are undertaken. I think it's six months or a year before. It doesn't involve any of the other two coconspirators, Mr. Fried or Mr. Khan, and it's a passbook loan. So the bank would testify that on a passbook loan, because the bank doesn't have any risk, that they would approve this loan whereas the other loans presented somewhat of a risk.

I think the overriding concern we have is that in addition to its lack of probative value, it's a 403 issue where the overwhelming prejudice of a defendant, as the government argues, taking advantage of his relatively young niece is really the major concern we have. And I think, Judge, they

really don't need it. Your Honor is correct with respect to the charged transaction in the indictment that involves Fried and Khan with respect to a loan involving Mr. Fried's father-in-law, that obviously involves Mr. Fried. And the third transaction without the niece involves both Fried and Mr. Khan.

So I think, Judge, there are a total of three transactions that the government could argue shows intent, shows lack of mistake, and shows everything that they need if the jury believes their witnesses.

So they'll write a letter, we'll obviously respond to it, but I think your Honor's initial reaction and initial concern is consistent with the defendant's concern.

THE COURT: Why don't you give me a further letter in the next two weeks, and within 10 days after that, you can respond. I'll review that and we can discuss it further on the 21st and finally, hopefully by that time, be able to set a firm trial date and be able to, at least on this issue, let me know what the extent of the admissibility of similar act evidence is going to be.

Is there anything else then we need to address today?

MR. BRAFMAN: No, your Honor.

MS. McLEOD: Your Honor, the government would move to exclude time until the conference date of March 21st to allow the parties to continue to prepare for trial.

THE COURT: The defense has consented to the exclusion of time.

MR. BRAFMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: So I will exclude time between now and the trial date. We'll either address this further issue and any other issues that might make this trial move more efficiently on the 21st or sometime in advance of whatever trial date that we pick if the 21st is not the appropriate time to do that.

I'll see everyone on the 21st at 10 o'clock and I'll wait to hear from you with regard to the proposed trial date.

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